Abstract-Efficiency is the bottleneck of many cryptographic protocols towards their practical application in different contexts. This holds true also in the context of electronic voting, where cryptographic protocols are used to ensure a diversity of security requirements, e.g. secrecy and integrity of cast votes. A new and promising application area of electronic voting is boardroom voting, which in practice takes place very frequently and often on simple issues such as approving or refusing a budget. Hence, it is not a surprise that a number of cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting have been already proposed. In this work, we introduce a security model adequate for the boardroom voting context. Further, we evaluate the efficiency of four boardroom voting protocols, which to best of our knowledge are the only boardroom voting protocols that satisfy our security model. Finally, we compare the performance of these protocols in different election settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many practical applications of cryptographic protocols, efficiency is one of the most crucial aspects to consider. Electronic voting, where cryptographic protocols are deployed to fulfill multiple security requirements such as vote secrecy or integrity, is not an exception. Currently, electronic voting has become of paramount interest for various contexts reaching from political elections at polling stations [1] or over the Internet [2] - [4] 1 to board elections in organisations such as universities, companies, or associations [5] . A new and promising application area of electronic voting is boardroom voting, which in practice takes place very frequently and often on simple issues such as approving or refusing a budget. Hence, it is not a surprise that a number of cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting have been already proposed [6] - [13] . Generally, such elections are spontaneously initiated and conducted quickly. Therefore, voters use small mobile devices such as their smartphones or tablet computers. Under these circumstances, the efficiency of cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting becomes even more important. The research goal of this work is to evaluate cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting regarding their efficiency within different election settings.
In order to achieve our goal, we proceed as follows. First, we study the boardroom voting context and propose a security model tailored to that context. We review the 1 The Norwegian government discarded Internet voting in 2014. literature and identify boardroom voting protocols that satisfy the proposed security model. We evaluate the identified protocols with regard to their efficiency. This evaluation is divided into two steps: First, we decompose boardroom voting protocols in their cryptographic building blocks and determine the required number of modular exponentiations. Second, we provide parametrized efficiency functions for the boardroom voting protocols. Finally, we compare the performance of boardroom voting protocols within different election settings, i.e., by looking at different electorate sizes and ballot types. 2 
II. BOARDROOM ELECTIONS
In this section we provide a general overview of elections in the context of boardroom voting. We mainly focus on the setting and procedure of boardroom elections. Further, we consider boardroom voting elections in the context of companies, where current security mechanisms and policies are deployed.
Electorate: Boardroom elections, which usually take place during boardroom meetings, are small-scale elections and therefore have a limited electorate. We denote the number of voters in the electorate as N . Some of them may follow the boardroom meeting and participate in the voting process from a remote place, for instance via phone or video conference.
Type of Election: Boardroom voting is mostly used for simple issues such as yes/no decisions, i.e., the voting rules are relatively simple and the number of voting options is limited. A voting rule, which we consider in our analysis, is where voters can select up to one of L options.
Equipment and Communication Infrastructure: Boardroom elections are often spontaneously initiated and conducted, and voters usually bring their commonly used device, for example a notebook, smartphone or tablet computer, on which the voting application has already been installed. Additionally, the voters' devices are usually connected to a common network, which allows exchanging messages (encrypted and signed votes) via a reliable broadcast channel.
Public-Key Infrastructure: In order to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the exchanged messages, boardroom elections imply the existence and deployment of a public-key infrastructure (PKI).
III. RESEARCH METHOD
The efficiency of boardroom voting protocols is essentially determined by the computational complexity of the used cryptographic primitives/protocols. In order to avoid that security is sacrificed for the sake of efficiency, the considered protocols should fulfill a security model adequate to the boardroom context. We therefore propose an adequate security model, which consists of security requirements and adversarial capabilities. We identify boardroom voting protocols from the scientific literature and consider only those that satisfy the proposed security model. Further, we determine the efficiency of each protocol by calculating the number of exponentiations of all cryptographic building blocks in use. For the sake of comparison, in our analysis we omit exponentiations with small exponents: If calculations occur in a multiplicative group of order q, and l q denotes the bit length of q, we consider only exponentiations for exponents with the potential of having the bit length of l q . Finally, we provide a performance comparison of all considered protocols within different election settings 4 
IV. ADEQUATE SECURITY MODEL
In this section we propose an adequate security model for context of boardroom voting. The security model consists of two parts, namely the security requirements and the adversarial capabilities. Further, we advocate the adequacy of the security model by justifying the adversarial capabilities.
A. Security Requirements
Many scientific works, e.g. [15] - [18] , are dedicated to the definition of security requirements in the context of Internet voting protocols. As the requirements eligibility and anonymity depend on the specific implementation in terms of authentication, within this work we restrict our attention to secrecy, integrity, robustness. We build our work upon the following definitions:
Secrecy: The protocol does not provide more evidence about an eligible voter's intention than the election result [15] .
Integrity: The protocol ensures that each vote is correctly included in the election result [15] .
Robustness:
The protocol returns the election result [19] .
B. Adversarial Capabilities
We assume following restrictions on the adversary 5 :
The adversary is computationally restricted and therefore cannot break the underlying cryptographic primitives/protocols, namely the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. We justify this restriction by the fact that boardroom elections are spontaneously initiated and conducted, i.e. the time frame to manipulate votes is relatively limited. Furthermore, the impact of the election result is timely limited, i.e. the violation of vote secrecy in the long-term is not a significant concern.
The adversary is not able to corrupt more than half of the voters with regard to secrecy violations. We justify this assumption by the fact that if more than half of the voters are corrupt, they can dictate their intention regarding the election outcome. In this case vote secrecy becomes subordinated (relatively irrelevant).
The adversary cannot compromise or coerce voters to violate their vote secrecy 6 . Hence, we assume that voters are honest and do not provide the adversary with any proof of how they voted. Further, voters are free to ignore adversarial instructions, which aim to violate their vote secrecy. Similarly to Benaloh [20] , we justify this restriction by the fact that modern-technology, for instance wearable cameras such as Google glasses, render even protections used in the paperbased polling station elections mostly inefficacious.
The adversary is not able to disrupt messages sent over the communication channel. This restriction is justified by the fact that mechanisms that ensure a reliable communication channel, for instance Byzantine agreement [21] , are in place.
The adversary is not able to block at least half of the voters from the communication channel. This restriction is justified by the fact that even if the adversary can block one communication channel, e.g. WLAN, voters can use a different channel, e.g. mobile network.
The adversary is not able to compromise voters' devices in order to violate vote secrecy. We justify this restriction by the fact that in the business context, there are often policies in place, which mitigate the risk of malware infection.
V. LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of boardroom voting protocols have been proposed in the literature. A seminal work to boardroom voting protocols has been presented by DeMillo et al. [6] and extended in [7] . The protocol uses a decryption mix net approach for anonymizing votes. A second branch of works has been initiated by Kiayias et al [8] and improved in [9] , [10] . All of these protocols rely on the availability of all voters to compute the election result, thus failing to fulfill robustness according to our proposed security model. Ritter [11] adapted the technique of homomorphic tallying to the boardroom voting context and proposed two derivations of his protocol tailored towards simple and complex ballots. In similar vein, Kulyk et al. [12] adapted the technique of reencryption mix net-based election to the boardroom voting context. Further, Khader et al. [13] suggested a boardroom voting protocol building upon selfdissolving commitments. These protocols, namely [11] , [12] and [13] satisfy the proposed security model and are therefore considered in the remainder of this work. 
VI. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BUILDING BLOCKS OF BOARDROOM VOTING PROTOCOLS
After the protocols that satisfy our security model have been identified, we decompose the protocols into their cryptographic building blocks. The results are presented in Table I. ElGamal cryptosystem: Generally, boardroom voting protocols build upon the ElGamal cryptosystem [24] , which is of particular interest due to its homomorphic properties.
Digital signatures:
The sender authenticity is ensured by the use of digital signatures. For the sake of consistency in our efficiency evaluation, we assume the use of DSA signatures [25] as these signatures build upon the DDH assumption.
Advanced encryption standard: Given the fact that symmetric cryptosystems are generally more efficient than their asymmetric counterparts, private channels between communication partners are established by the use of the AES cryptosystem.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange: Building upon an established PKI, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [26] , [27] allows two communication partners to create an AES key.
Commitment schemes: The herein investigated protocols build upon a simple commitment scheme in which a group generator is raised to the power of the committing value, as used in [22] , e.g. to commit on a vote in the voting phase which is only revealed in the tallying phase.
Zero-knowledge proofs: The proofs that are used in boardroom voting protocolls are the proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm (also called preimage proofs) [28] , the proof of equality of two discrete logarithms [29] and well-formedness proofs which are used to prove that a ciphertext/commitment contains a message from a given set of messages [22] , [23] .
Threshold ElGamal key generation and decryption: The herein investigated protocols distribute the trust by generating a public ElGamal key and a set of private ElGamal key shares with a combination of a distributed secret sharing scheme [30] with the ElGamal cryptosystem, as suggested in [31] .
Reencryption mix net: The purpose of a reencryption mix net is to anonymize a set of ciphertexts, such that links between the output and the input are removed. The boardroom voting protocols considered in this work implement a correctness proof of shuffle according to [32] .
VII. BOARDROOM VOTING PROTOCOLS
This section describes and evaluates the four boardroom voting protocols satisfying the proposed security model. Each protocol is described in terms of required calculations per voter (relying on used cryptographic building blocks). Thereby, we are able to provide the overview of protocols' efficiency in form of parametrized functions. 7 
A. Homomorphic tallying, single encryption
The general idea of this protocol is that voters encrypt their ballots into one ciphertext. The individual ciphertexts of voters are aggregated into one by using the homomorphic property of the ElGamal cryptosystem and then tallied. 
Setup:
In the setup phase, the distributed key generation for the threshold of t ≤ N is executed. This takes a total of 3N + t − 2 exponentiations (N + t − 2 for generating private key shares, and 2N for generating the public key). Each voter has to sign N + 1 and to verify the signatures of 3(N − 1) messages, resulting in total computational cost for the setup phase of 10N + t − 7 exponentiations.
Vote Casting: In order to cast her vote, first the voter encrypts her vote into a single ElGamal ciphertext (2 exponentiations) 8 . In addition to the encrypted vote, voters provide a well-formedness proof stating that the ciphertext contains a valid vote. The proof takes 11 exponentiations. Including the costs of signing one message and verifying the signatures on N − 1 messages, the total computational costs for the vote casting phase are 12 + 2N exponentiations. Tallying: To compute the final tally, first each voter verifies the correctness of all N − 1 well-formedness proofs obtained from the others, requiring 11(N − 1) exponentiations. The decryption of the election result requires from each voter the computation of a partial decryption share (1 exponentiation) and the generation of a validity proof for the decryption (2 exponentiations), the verification of other voters' proofs (4 exponentiations for each proof), and the reconstruction of the plaintext from the threshold amount of partial decryption shares (t exponentiations). Note, that since a total of t valid partial decryption shares is needed for the plaintext reconstruction, the exact number of proofs one has to verify depends on whether there are corrupted voters that send invalid proofs that still need to be processed. However, the presence of invalid proofs seems not to be realistic because the effort needed for such a corruption is too high compared to the pay-off for the adversary -the election can only be slowed down, but not hindered completely. Therefore in our analysis we consider the case, where no voters send faulty messages, and a total of t − 1 proofs need to be verified.
Given the use of the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem, the determination of the final election result requires the computation of a discrete logarithm. The computation of this logarithm is implemented by an exhaustive search over all 
B. Homomorphic tallying, multiple encryptions
Similarly to the homomorphic tallying (single encryption), voters' ciphertexts are aggregated in the tallying phase. As op-posed to the single encryption case, in the multiple encryption case, voters encrypt their ballots individually for each possible voting option. Hence, in the tallying phase, the election result is tallied by computing the number of votes each voting option has obtained, individually.
The initialization and setup phase are identical to the single encryption case.
Vote Casting: In this approach, the cast vote is multiple ciphertexts each representing one option. The selected option is represented as an encryption of 1, and all the other options as encryptions of 0, with all the encryptions requiring a total of 2L exponentiations. One then has to compute the wellformedness proofs for each voting option as well as for their sum. These proofs require 6(L + 1) exponentiations. Including the costs for signing one message and verifying the signatures of N − 1 messages, the resulting computational costs for the vote casting phase are 8L + 2N + 5.
Tallying: Before computing the final tally, all (L+1)(N −1) well-formedness proofs are checked by every voter. This requires 8(LN + N − L − 1) exponentiations. The threshold decryption is then executed L times, once for each voting option. As in Section VII-A, we assume that all the validity proofs for the decryption sent during this phase are valid, and therefore the threshold decryption requires a total of 5Lt − L exponentiations. Calculating the final result from the decrypted values requires the computation of the result for each voting option individually, which, however, consists of exponentiations with small exponents only (with values up to N), and therefore is not included into the analysis. Additional costs consist of signing one message and verifying the signatures of t − 1 messages. The final computational costs of the tallying phase are therefore 8LN +8N −9L−9+5Lt+2t exponentiations. 
C. Mix Net-Based Tallying
The third protocol satisfying the proposed security model builds upon a different approach to anonymize cast votes. Rather than aggregating votes, in the mix net-based approach votes are anonymized through shuffling and tallied individually. Initialization and setup are identical to the protocol in Section VII-A, thus we omit their description here.
Vote Casting: To cast a vote, the voter first computes an ElGamal encryption of her ballot (2 exponentiations). In addition, the voter proves knowledge of the plaintext to enforce ballotindependence [34] , which is done by proving the knowledge of discrete logarithm (1 exponentiation). Additional computational costs occur for signing one message and verifying the signatures on N −1 messages, with the total costs being 2N +2 exponentiations.
Tallying: At the beginning of the tallying phase, each voter verifies the plaintext knowledge proofs of all other voters, resulting in 2(N − 1) exponentiations. The remainder of the tallying is executed in two sub-phases: the mixing phase and the decryption phase.
In the mixing sub-phase, a set of voters is selected for acting as a reencryption mix nodes-one after each other according to the order agreed on in the setup phase. At least 2 honest voters must participate in the mixing process; thus, the total amount of mix nodes is N −t+2 9 . In each mixing round, the computational costs are 10N + 5 exponentiations for the mix node (2N for reencryption, 8N +5 for the proof of shuffle), followed by 9N + 11 exponentiations for the rest of the voters verifying the shuffle. Additional costs for the round consist of signing (by the mixing node) and verifying the signature (by the rest of the voters) of one message, consisting of 3 exponentiations. For N −t+2 mixing rounds, the total costs for the mixing sub-phase thus are 19N 2 + 59N − 19Nt − 19t + 36 exponentiations.
In the decryption phase, each of the N anonymized ciphertexts is decrypted using the threshold decryption, resulting in 5Nt − N exponentiations 10 . Adding the costs of signing one message and verifying t − 1 messages, the total costs of the decryption sub-phase consist of 5Nt − N + 2t − 1 exponentiations.
In order to obtain the result, the votes for each option are being added up over all decrypted votes. The total computational costs of the tallying phase are therefore 19N 2 + 58N − 14Nt − 17t + 35 exponentiations. 
D. Protocol Based on Self-Dissolving Commitments
Similar to the protocol in Section VII-A, the fourth protocol is based on the concept of homomorphic tallying, with the vote encoded as a single value.
Setup: Every voter picks a random value and communicates its commitment together with the preimage proof to all other voters, which requires 2 exponentiations for commitment and proof, and 1 exponentiation for signing the message. When all N − 1 such pairs of commitments and proofs have been received from the other voters and successfully verified (2N −2 exponentiations for the verification of the proof, and 2N −2 for the verification of signatures on N − 1 messages), each voter uses them to calculate the value needed for casting the vote (note, that this calculation requires only multiplications and calculation of inverse, therefore not included in our efficiency analysis). The total costs of setup phase are therefore 4N − 1 exponentiations.
Vote Casting: To cast a vote for an option, each voter computes one commitment to their vote (1 exponentiation). Before communicating the commitment to everyone, the voter computes the corresponding well-formedness proof (11 exponentiations) 11 . Casting the vote to the others is done in two rounds, first by communicating the proof (which serves the purpose of a commitment) and second by communicating the vote (2 exponentiations for signing 2 messages, 4N − 4 for verifying the signatures on 2(N − 1) messages). Sending the proof and the vote separately is necessary for the fairness property of the protocol. Overall, the computational costs for the vote casting phase are 4N + 10 exponentiations.
Recovery: If in any previous step a voter stops following the protocol, a special recovery phase exists for the set of remaining voters to guarantee the robustness of the protocol. Given the fact that the adversary might block the access to the communication channel for several voters IV, we consider the conduct of a recovery phase. The phase requires 1 exponentiation in addition to one proof of discrete logarithm equality (2 exponentiation) and verification of N − 1 such proofs (4N − 4 exponentiations). Furthermore, additional costs are for signing of one message and verifying the signatures of N −1 messages, resulting in total of 6N − 2 exponentiations. 
VIII. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON IN DIFFERENT ELECTION SETTINGS
In this section we illustrate and compare the performance of the protocols in different election settings. For our evaluation, we consider the established PKI based on DSA keys. In addition, according to the security model proposed in Section IV, we set the threshold value t = N/2 + 1.
The evaluation results show that the protocols based on selfdissolving commitments and single encryption homomorphic tallying perform particularly well for simple ballot types, for instance with 2 voting options. The multiple encryption homomorphic tallying protocol outperforms the self-dissolving commitments and the single encryption homomorphic protocol when the election setting gets more complex. More precisely, having 7 or more voters with 5 voting options; having 4 or more voters with 10 voting options; and having 2 or more voters with 30 voting options. In case of 30 voting options, for less than 25 voters, the mix net-based protocol outperforms all other protocols.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we conducted an efficiency evaluation of cryptographic protocols proposed in the literature for boardroom voting setting. For this, we first derived a security model adequate to the boardroom voting setting. Then, we conducted a literature review on boardroom voting protocols, and extracted those that satisfy our security model. Further, we analyzed the efficiency of each protocol by calculating the number of exponentiations of the used cryptographic building blocks and provide an overview of the protocols' efficiency in form of parametrized functions. Finally, we provided a performance comparison of the considered protocols within different election settings. The results of the performance comparison indicate that there is no protocol that is the most efficient in all election settings. Rather, choosing the most adequate protocol depends on the concrete election setting.
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